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Abstract. A number of retailers offer gambling- or lottery-type price promotions with a
chance to receive one’s entire purchase for free. Although these retailers seem to share the
intuition that probabilistic free price promotions are attractive to consumers, it is unclear
how they compare to traditional sure price promotions of equal expected monetary value.
We compared these two risky and sure price promotions for planned purchases across
six experiments in the field and in the laboratory. Together, we found that consumers are
not only more likely to purchase a product promoted with a probabilistic free discount
over the same product promoted with a sure discount but that they are also likely to
purchase more of it. This preference seems to be primarily due to a diminishing sensitivity
to the prices. In addition, we find that the zero price effect, transaction cost, and novelty
considerations are likely not implicated.
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Introduction
Over the years, a number of retailers have offered
gambling- or lottery-type price discounts to promote
their sales. For example, a few years ago several retail-
ers inNewEngland promised full refunds to customers
who bought their items in the few weeks leading to
the Super Bowl and World Series in the event that the
Patriots or the Red Sox, respectively, won. In the case
of Jordan’s Furniture, the retailer took in 30,000 orders
during the almost 6-week promotion period in 2007,
and one customer, who took advantage of the promo-
tion to buy furniture for his entire house, ended up get-
ting back $40,000 because the Red Sox won the World
Series (Reed 2007). Similarly, a family-run appliance
store retailer in Worcester that linked its promotion to
the win of the Patriots in the Super Bowl 2008 expected
that the gambling-type discount would account for
20%–30% of its business in that year (Sanders 2008).
These conditional price promotions were by design
ambiguous in terms of their probability of occurring.
Most recently three separate retail chains in Ger-
many (Real, a “hyper-store” chain similar to Walmart
in the United States; Mann Mobilia XXXL, one of
the biggest furniture store chains; and Media Markt,
the leading consumer electronics retailer, similar to
Best Buy in the United States) ran one-week promo-
tions announcing that every 100th and 10th purchase,
respectively, would be free. In case of the Media Markt
campaign in 2010, the probabilistic free price pro-
motion, with its unambiguously defined probabilities,
was determined at the end of day of the purchase and
needed to be cashed in stores within 14 days of the
purchase date (see Figure 1).
The retailers mentioned above seem to share the
intuition that a gambling- or lottery-type of price pro-
motion is attractive to consumers, which might be
based on the observation that consumer spending on
gambling, including lotteries, is a multibillion-dollar
industry (e.g., $98 billion in the United States; IBIS-
World 2013) that continues to show solid growth. This
attraction to risk can in part be attributed to wish-
ful thinking and wishful betting, the tendency to be
overoptimistic that a desirable future outcome (the big
prize) will occur and to bet more aggressively on it
250
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Figure 1. (Color online) Media Markt’s Advertised
Probabilistic Price Promotion, Offering Every
10th Purchase for Free
Notes. Translation from German:
Focal message: “Every 10th purchase for free! The last digit of a
receipt numberWinning number.”
Picture of receipt on the bottom left, text above the arrow pointing on the
receipt: “Here you find the winning number.”
Text in the yellow banner to the right of the receipt: “This is how easy
it is go get your money back: With the correct last digit of your
receipt number, your purchase is for free! Only until January 9! The
daily winning number: after 22:30 o’clock on mediamarkt.de and
on the phone at 0800/800 70 60.”
Disclaimer in small black font under the yellow banner focuses first on
phone and Internet service contracts as well as warranties that are excluded
from this promotion and then states: “The winnings need to be picked
up within 14 days after date of your purchase.”
Source. Used with permission from Media-Saturn-Holding GmbH.
(Bar-Hillel and Budescu 1995, Seybert and Bloomfield
2009, Trope et al. 1997).1
Despite such intuitions, the vast majority of promo-
tions are not probabilistic, suggesting that the belief
in such pricing mechanisms is far from universal. In
addition, it is also unclear how such probabilistic price
promotions that offer something for free (probabilis-
tic free price promotion) compare with the ubiquitous
traditional sure price promotions (Han et al. 2001) if
the latter offered a fixed discount of equal expected
monetary value. That is, it is unclear whether and why
customers would be more, less, or equally attracted to
shopping at a store that offered, e.g., a 10% chance to
get their purchases for free (with a 90% chance to pay
the regular price) when there are other stores that carry
the same items but offer them at a guaranteed, fixed
percentage off. Similarly, theremay be situationswhere
a retailer (e.g., Kayak.com) sells products (e.g., hotel
rooms) by some suppliers with a price promotion and
other suppliers without a price promotion, and it is
unclear if and why a probabilistic free price promotion
may be more successful in shifting the market share
of the corresponding product than would a sure price
promotion. These questions are highly relevant to mar-
keters (retailers and suppliers alike) who may want to
promote some products or stores over others.
In this paper we investigate under controlled con-
ditions whether, to what extent, and why for planned
purchases a probabilistic free price promotion is pre-
ferred to a sure price promotion of equal expected
monetary value (i.e., discount) when the probabili-
ties are unambiguously defined (similar to the Media
Markt example from Germany mentioned above) and
the discount immediately determined and paid out at
checkout. Across six experiments we find that such
a probabilistic free price promotion is indeed more
attractive. Furthermore, the preference for the prob-
abilistic free price promotion is fairly robust across
various probabilities of wining and across various
product price levels. Finally, we show that this pref-
erence is not driven by an attraction to a zero price,
an aversion to transaction cost, or novelty, but rather
primarily due to a diminishing sensitivity to the prices.
Standard Rational Fundamentals:
Expected Utility Theory
Standard expected utility theory predicts that con-
sumers are risk averse2 and will thus prefer the sure
price promotion over a probabilistic free price promo-
tion of equal expected value. For very small stakes,
consumers have been shown to be risk neutral (Rabin
2000), whichwould imply indifference between the two
promotions. Thus, depending on the magnitude of the
stakes, we expect either indifference or a preference for
sure discounts.
Behavioral Fundamentals
From a behavioral decision theory perspective, the dif-
ferences between the two types of price promotion can
give rise to several types of psychological processes.
Moreover, because of the multitude of these potential
psychological processes, it is not clear how the two
types of price promotion will translate into a prefer-
ence of one type of promotion over the other.
Factors Favoring the Sure Price Promotion
Uncertainty Effect. The “uncertainty effect” (Gneezy
et al. 2006) posits that, because we dislike uncertainty,
individuals value a risky gain prospect less than its
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worst possible outcome (i.e., direct risk aversion; see
Newman and Mochon 2012, Simonsohn 2009). That is,
according to the uncertainty effect, people value the
probabilistic free price promotion with its two possible
outcomes (best possible outcome, free; worst possible
outcome, paying the regular price) less than paying the
regular price. As a result, individuals are expected to
value the probabilistic price promotion less than the
sure nonfree price promotion of equal expected dis-
count and act accordingly.
Certainty Effect. Similar to the uncertainty effect, the
“certainty effect” as coined by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979, p. 265) posits that “people overweight outcomes
that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which
are merely probable” (for all 0 < p < 1, pi(p) + pi ·
(1 − p) < 1). Thus, both the uncertainty effect and
the certainty effect predict that consumers would pre-
fer a sure price promotion over a probabilistic price
promotion.
Factors Favoring the Probabilistic Free
Price Promotion
Zero Price Effect. One factor that could favor the prob-
abilistic price promotion is the attraction to zero prices.
Previous research has shown that promotions that offer
something for free are likely to be evaluated differ-
ently (Chandran and Morwitz 2006, Nunes and Park
2003, Palmeira 2011) than nonfree promotions. Build-
ing on this work, Shampanier et al. (2007) found that
people experienced significantly more positive affect
when facing a free offer (the price equals $0) compared
with other price offers (e.g., the price equals $0.01 or
$0.02), and this disproportionately positive affect led
to a larger demand for zero-priced products than what
standard cost-benefit analysis would have predicted. In
line with this account, individuals may find the proba-
bilistic free price promotion more attractive than a sure
price promotion because the former includes an addi-
tional positive element, which is the possibility of get-
ting something for nothing. It is important to note that
one other prediction of this account is that the attrac-
tion to the probabilistic free price promotion should be
independent of the price level or the probability p of
winning the product for free (which we test directly).
Transaction Cost. Similarly to the zero price effect,
hassle or transaction cost considerations would favor
the probabilistic free price promotion. This is because
winning the probabilistic free price promotion avoids
these costs—there is no need to take out one’s wallet
and pay.
Novelty. Another factor that could favor the proba-
bilistic price promotion is novelty. Customers may find
probabilistic price promotions particularly appealing
simply because they have had no previous encounter
with such promotions (for novelty as an arousal-
inducing stimulus that increases individuals’ proba-
bility of self-exposure to it, see, e.g., Berlyne 1970).
As with the zero price effect and an aversion to trans-
action cost, this factor should lead to an attraction to
the probabilistic price promotion that is independent
of the price level or the probability p of winning the
product for free.
Diminishing Sensitivity. Another set of predictions
can be made based on diminishing sensitivity. As
demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981)
seminal experiment, when participants were asked
whether they would travel 20 minutes to purchase a
calculator [jacket] typically priced at $15 [$125] on sale
for $10 [$120], they were more willing to travel the
20 minutes for the same $5 discount for the cheaper
calculator than for the more expensive jacket. This
finding shows that, when evaluating a sure discount,
people compare the discounted price to the regular, full
price and behave in a Weber–Fechnerian way (Stigler
1965); that is, people display diminishing sensitivity as
prices increase, a basic psychophysical principle that
is reflected, e.g., in the concavity of prospect theory’s
gain value function (v(x) xα, for x ≥ 0, with α < 1 (see
also Thaler (1980)).
Therefore, if individuals display diminishing sensi-
tivity to prices, the perceived value of the sure discount
is the difference in perceived magnitude of the regular,
full price versus the discounted sure price:
V(Sure discount) (Regular price)α
− (Discounted sure price)α . (1)
In a situation in which a customer is choosing between
a sure price promotion and a probabilistic price pro-
motion of equal expected value, and where the prob-
abilistic price promotion offers a chance p to not pay
anything (i.e., “winning”), from (1) it follows that
V(Sure discount)  (Regular price)α
− ((1− p) × (Regular price))α
 (1− (1− p)α) × (Regular price)α . (2)
Although the evidence on how individuals perceive
sure price promotions is rather convincing (Tversky
and Kahneman 1981), it is an open question how indi-
viduals may perceive the value of probabilistic price
promotions (i.e., what happens under uncertainty). If
individuals perceive them in a similar way to the way
in which they perceive sure price promotions (i.e., they
focus on themagnitude of the prices), we would expect
the value of the probabilistic discount to be
V(Probabilistic discount)
 (Regular price)α − p × (Discounted probabilistic price)α
− (1 − p) × (Regular price)α . (3)
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For probabilistic free price promotions (i.e., the dis-
counted probabilistic price  $0) it follows that
V(Probabilistic free discount)
 (Regular price)α − (1− p) × (Regular price)α
 p × (Regular price)α . (4)
From this it follows that
V(Sure discount) < V(Probabilistic free discount),
for all 0 < p < 1 and α < 1.3 (5)
With these assumptions, individuals should always
prefer a probabilistic free price promotion to a sure
price promotion of equal expected value. In other
words, if we assume that individuals display dimin-
ishing sensitivity and we are dealing with probabilis-
tic promotions that include the chance p of getting
the purchase for free (otherwise (1− p) chance of pay-
ing the regular price), then we would expect individ-
uals to attach a greater value to the probabilistic free
price promotion than to the sure price promotion of
equal expected value. This would hold true indepen-
dent of the price level (i.e., for all α < 1: V(Probabilistic
free discount)/V(Sure discount) > 1). Further, the prefer-
ence for the probabilistic free price promotion, mea-
sured as the ratio V(Probabilistic free discount)/V(Sure
discount), is decreasing as the probability of getting the
product for free increases (i.e., p→ 1). The solid line
in Figure 2, panel A depicts the preference ratio and
Figure 2, panel B depicts the difference between the
two price promotions’ values for diminishing sensitiv-
ity α  0.88 (see parameter estimation in Tversky and
Kahneman 1992).
Diminishing Sensitivity and Probability Weighting.
A modification to diminishing sensitivity could come
from adding a component based on the probabil-
ity value function of Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979)
prospect theory. Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky
(1979) describe decision weights of probabilities pi(p)
such that small probabilities are generally over-
weighted (pi(p) > p; the probability weighting func-
tion is concave) and large probabilities are under-
weighted (pi(p) < p; the probability weighting function
is convex). The dashed line in Figure 2, panel A dis-
plays the predicted preference ratio of the probabilis-
tic free price promotion to the sure price promotion
based on Prelec’s (1998, p. 505) probability weight-
ing function pi(p)  exp[−β × (− ln p)γ], with β  1 and
γ  0.65, and with diminishing sensitivity α  0.88
(see the parameter estimation in Tversky and Kahne-
man 1992); Figure 2, panel B depicts the difference
of the two price promotion’s values. As can be seen,
with these parameter assumptions, individuals should
attach a greater value to the probabilistic price promo-
tion over the sure price promotion of equal expected
Figure 2. (Color online) Predicted Attraction to the
Probabilistic Free over the Sure Price Promotion
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value for most probabilities. Another prediction of this
perspective is that the preference for the probabilistic
price promotion, measured as the ratio V(Probabilistic
free discount)/V(Sure discount), is decreasing as the
probability of getting the product for free increases
(i.e., p→ 1). Unlike the case with dimishing sensitivity
only (i.e., no decision weights), the decrease is much
sharper. Yet another prediction of this perspective is
that the preference will reverse (i.e., V(Probabilistic free
discount)/V(Sure discount) < 1) to a preference for the
sure price promotion for p > 0.76.
Previous Consumer Behavior Research on
Probabilistic Promotions
The literature most relevant to the work presented here
is on ambiguity. Specifically, most recently, Goldsmith
and Amir (2010) focused on sales promotions that
promised that consumers would either receive a less
valued product gift (bag of unpopped popcorn) or
a more valued product gift (a can of soda) with the
purchase of a candy bar, without disclosing the prob-
abilities of receiving either gift. In their incentive-
compatible experiment in an on-campus snack shop,
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Goldsmith and Amir (2010) observed a higher pur-
chase rate for the promoted candy bar when the
gift was more valued than when it was less valued.
More importantly, the purchase rate of the candy bar,
when coupled with a promotion that was ambigu-
ously defined as either of the two (less or more val-
ued) gifts, did not differ from when coupled with a
more valued gift promotion (the three types of promo-
tions were run separately, one condition at a time). The
authors suggested that their findingswere due towish-
ful thinking, which made customers focus on the best
option of the ambiguously defined promotion. Extrap-
olating Goldsmith and Amir’s (2010) findings from the
product promotions domain to our price promotions
domain and from unknown to known probabilities, a
probabilistic price promotion that offered, e.g., a 10%
chance to get a purchase for free and a 90% chance
to pay the regular price would cause consumers to
focus on the best possible outcome (“free”). As a con-
sequence, such a probabilistic price promotion would
be as effective and thus cheaper for a retailer than sim-
ply offering a product for free with certainty. That is,
individuals would value the risky prospect the same
as its best possible realization, a conclusion that may
not be intuitive and is in opposition to the prediction
of the uncertainty effect. However, if true, then a prob-
abilistic discount would also be superior to a certain
discount of equal expected monetary value (e.g., 10%
off the regular price for sure).
In other related work Dhar et al. (1995; see also 1999)
tested in an incentive-compatible experiment in an
on-campus store whether an imprecisely stated price
promotion (e.g., “around X% off”) was more or less
successful in increasing the market share of a candy
bar than a precisely stated price promotion (“X% off”),
(Dhar et al. (1995, 1999) ran one type of promotion at
a time). Although not the main focus of their work,
their three precise discount-conditions (“20% off” ver-
sus “25% chance of saving 80%” versus “80% chance
of saving 25%”) allow for the equal expected mone-
tary value-type of comparison on which we are focus-
ing. Interestingly, and unlike the extrapolation from
Goldsmith and Amir’s (2010) findings, Dhar et al.
(1995, 1999) found a null effect. That is, they found no
significant difference in the market shares of a candy
bar when offered with any of these three price promo-
tions, implying that probabilistic price promotions do
not differ in their attraction from sure price promotions
of equal expected monetary value or discount.
Overview of Experiments
Given the mixed predictions based on existing the-
ories as well as findings from previous research in
marketing, it is unclear if, how, and why a proba-
bilistic price promotion with a chance to get one’s
purchase for free differs from a sure price promo-
tion of equal expected monetary value—questions that
should be of importance for marketers that are trying
to improve on their price promotion strategies. The
current paper addresses this question for planned pur-
chases through a series of four incentive-compatible
experiments in the field (Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and
in the laboratory (Experiment 4) and two hypotheti-
cal online experiments (Experiments 5a and 5b) across
products of varying regular, full-price levels ($0.75 to
$200). The paper concludes with a discussion of the
theoretical and practical implications and its limita-
tions, as well as several potential directions for future
research.
The general set-up in Experiments 1–4 was such that
we offered consumers a choice between a probabilistic
price promotion and a sure price promotion of equal
expected monetary value (joint valuation setting) at
the point of purchase, and we measured the percent of
purchases made with a probabilistic price promotion
choice. In Experiments 5a and 5b, promotions were
offered separately (separate valuation setting), one at a
time, and we measured the percent of purchases made
(traffic) as well as the average consumer demand (bas-
ket size). Except for Experiment 1, we presented partic-
ipants with the following information:4
—for the probabilistic price promotion: p% chance
of paying the discounted probabilistic price (e.g., $0)
and (1− p)% chance of paying the regular price;
—for the sure price promotion: 100% chance of pay-
ing the discounted sure price, that is, p% off the regular
price.
In addition, we randomized the order in which we
presented offers. Unless reported otherwise, no con-
ditions, measures, or subjects were dropped from the
experiments reported in this paper.
Experiment 1: Vending Machine
For our first experiment we purchased a vending
machine (see Figure S1 in the online supplementary
materials and methods, available at https://doi.org/
10.1287/mnsc.2015.2328) that we placed next to two
existing vending machines centrally located in a stu-
dent lounge where they were frequented by students,
faculty, and staff members on a regular basis. Our
vending machine had 10 buttons for candies. We
stacked the vending machine with five types of candy,
with two buttons each: Snickers, M&M’s, Twix, 3
Musketeers, and Starburst. The vending machine was
opaque (individuals could not see the inside), and the
candies were represented with a picture and a price
placed next to each of the 10 buttons. All candies
retailed at a regular, full price of $0.75 (the same as
the candies in the other two vending machines in the
lounge). A candy’s price also appeared on the display
when people pressed a button. The vending machine
could sell only one candy at a time.
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Figure 3. (Color online) Vending Machine Sign
Announcing the Promotions in Experiment 1
Procedure
We manipulated the prices for the candy over time
and recorded the sales volume. Our experiment con-
sisted of three two-week periods. For the first two
weeks (“before period”) and the last two weeks (“after
period”), we offered the candy at the regular price
of $0.75 each. Between these two periods we ran a
two-week sales promotion in which we offered two
different types of price promotion: A sure price pro-
motion offering 33% off the regular price (consumers
had to pay a discounted sure price of $0.50 for a candy)
and a probabilistic price promotion that required con-
sumers to first pay the regular price $0.75 for a candy
but offered a 33% chance to get their money back
when the candywas released (themoneywaswrapped
around the candy).5 Both types of promotions offered
an expected discount or “gain” of $0.25. The two
promotions were offered simultaneously with a sign
prominently displayed at eye level on the front of the
vending machine announcing and color-coding both
types of promotion (see Figure 3). Since each type of
candy occupied two buttons of the vending machine,
one button (with a green sticker) represented the sure
price promotion and the other button (red sticker) rep-
resented the probabilistic free price promotion. Thus,
consumers could decidewhich promotion theywanted
by pressing the corresponding button (formore details,
see Supplementary Materials and Methods).
Results and Discussion
First, the promotion proved very successful: sales in-
creased from 83 candies in the “before period” to
204 candies during the promotion period. After our
promotion ended, sales in the “after period” went
back to 81 candies. Second and more importantly, dur-
ing the promotion period we sold almost 50% more
candy with the probabilistic price promotion (120 can-
dies) compared to sales with the sure price promo-
tion (84 candies). In other words, of the 204 candies
sold during the promotion period, 59% were pur-
chased with the probabilistic free promotion and 41%
were purchased with the sure promotion, and this
ratio was significantly different from an equal split
(χ2(1,N  204) 6.353, p  0.012).6
Experiment 2: Differing Probabilities at a
Local Video Store
Our first experiment with the vending machine shows
that, when offered a choice between the two types
of promotion, consumers are more likely to choose
the probabilistic (risky) free price promotion than the
traditional, sure price promotion. Next, we examined
the robustness of the attraction to the probabilistic
free price promotion across a range of probabilities
and with a higher-priced product for which the prices
and discounts are less likely considered “peanuts.”
Previous research (see, e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein
1991, Weber and Chapman 2005) has shown that for
small-stakes gains with at least medium probabilities
(p > 10%) to win, people become less risk averse than
for large-stakes gains. Furthermore, for sufficiently
small gains of less than $1, Markowitz (1952) posited
that people might even become risk seeking.7 Thus, if
we found that, for choices where the sure discount was
greater than $1, we continued to observe an attraction
to the probabilistic free price promotion (i.e., signifi-
cantly more than 50% choose it), the findings could be
less likely considered an artifact of the “peanuts” effect.
In addition, given the promotional sign on the vend-
ing machine, we might have attracted some consumers
that originally did not intend to purchase a candy. Sim-
ilarly, some of the higher sales volume for probabilistic
free price promotion candy in Experiment 1 could have
been caused by individual customers purchasing more
than one candy due to the “windfall” of getting a candy
for free (i.e., customers making additional unplanned
purchases on top of their planned purchase rather than
the probabilistic free price promotion attracting more
of the planned purchases than the sure price promo-
tion). Thus, we attempted to replicate our findings in a
more controlled settingwhere we could limit the quan-
tity eligible for discount to one item per customer and
ensure that customers learned about the promotions
only when they were at the checkout counter. For this
purpose, we conducted our experiment at a local video
rental store where a DVD rental cost $4.50.
Procedure
Three hundred and twenty-five customers in a local
video rental store were informed at checkout by ex-
perimenters disguised as staff that the store had a
special price promotion valid for one DVD movie per
customer. Customers were told that they could choose
between two types of price promotion, a sure promo-
tion and a probabilistic promotion, and that if they
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Table 1. Customers’ Choices Between the Probabilistic Free and Sure Price Promotions in the Five
Between-Subjects Conditions in Experiment 2
Customers choosing
Probabilistic free price the probabilistic free
Condition (%) promotion prices Sure price promotion price price promotion (%) χ2 (df, N) p-value
10 10% : $0 $4.05 76 19.059 <0.001
90% : $4.50 (10% off $4.50) (1, 68)
33 33% : $0 $3 68 8.067 0.005
67% : $4.50 (33% off $4.50) (1, 60)
50 50% : $0 $2.25 68 8.727 0.003
50% : $4.50 (50% off $4.50) (1, 66)
67 67% : $0 $1.50 66 6.452 0.011
33% : $4.50 (67% off $4.50) (1, 62)
90 90% : $0 $0.45 55 0.710 0.399
10% : $4.50 (90% off $4.50) (1, 69)
Note. The test results indicate the probability that the percent of customers choosing the probabilistic free price
promotion is different from the 50% chance level; df, degrees of freedom.
chose the probabilistic promotion they would have to
roll a die in order to find out if they had to pay $0 (dis-
counted probabilistic price) or $4.50 (regular price).
Using either a 6-sided or 10-sided die, we manipu-
lated the probabilities of winning between customers
on five different levels: 10%, 33%, 50%, 67%, and
90%, with the expected discounts $0.45, $1.50, $2.25,
$3, and $4.05, respectively (see Table 1). The condi-
tions were run one at a time, one hour each, with a
30-minute break between conditions. By design, the ex-
perimenters knew which condition they were running
at any given point in time but they were not aware of
any hypotheses. The experiment was conducted over
several days. Each day included all the conditions in a
randomized order.
Results and Discussion
The percentages of customers choosing the probabilis-
tic price promotion rather than the sure price promo-
tion are presented in Figure 4, and the χ2 test results
for the difference from an equal split are presented
in Table 1. As can be seen, contrary to what stan-
dard rational fundamentals and the uncertainty and
certainty effects would predict, the probabilistic free
price promotion attracted significantlymore customers
than the sure price promotion at all levels but one dis-
count level: all the way up to and including p  67%
(customers’ choice between the two promotions at the
p  90% level was not significantly different from an
equal split). First, these results replicate the findings
from Experiment 1 for a more expensive product and
over a wider range of probabilities with expected dis-
counts greater than $1 (i.e., for p > 10%). Thus, we
conclude that our findings are less likely an artifact of
the “peanuts” effect (Prelec and Loewenstein 1991).
Second, we observed a general decrease in the
attraction to the probabilistic price promotion rela-
tive to the sure price promotion as the probabili-
ties of winning and the expected discounts increased
(nominal logistic regression parameter estimate for
probability level p as continuous variable B  −1.1,
SE  0.43, χ2  6.48, p  0.01). This downward-sloping
trend counters the zero price effect, transaction cost,
and novelty effects as sole drivers of the attraction to
the probabilistic free price promotion, because each
of those explanations would require the attraction to
remain constant across probability levels.
Third, the facts that we do not see a sharp decline in
the attraction of the probabilistic free price promotion
and that we do not observe any probability level p at
which people significantly prefer the sure price promo-
tion over the probabilistic free price promotion suggest
that individuals’ preferences are largely affected by a
diminishing sensitivity to the prices and less so by deci-
sion weights (compare results in Table 1 and Figure 4
to those in Figure 2).
The following two experiments further examine pos-
sible causes underlying the apparent boost to people’s
Figure 4. (Color online) Observed Preference for the
Probabilistic Free Price Promotion Over the Equal Expected
Value Sure Price Promotion for a DVD Rental at a Regular
Price of $4.50 in Experiment 2
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risk seeking in purchases with probabilistic free price
promotions.
Experiment 3: Zero as a Special Price and
Transaction Cost
Experiment 3 was designed to test if customers’ at-
traction to the probabilistic free price promotion was
boosted at all by positive affective utility associated
with a free offering or by an aversion to trans-
action cost. Following the experimental design of
Shampanier et al. (2007), we set out to test this possi-
bility by comparing the attraction to the probabilistic
price promotion across conditions in which the best
possible outcome of the probabilistic price promotion
either involved a chance to get something for free (dis-
counted probabilistic price  $0) or a chance to pay a
small but relatively insignificant amount (discounted
probabilistic price > $0). If the attraction to the proba-
bilistic price promotion is driven solely by the affective
utility associated with a zero price or lower transaction
cost due to a chance of not having to pay, the attraction
should be significantly lessened or eliminated once the
best possible outcome of the probabilistic price pro-
motion does not offer a chance of getting the product
for free but requires paying a small price.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the same local video
rental store and with a similar procedure as in Exper-
iment 2. That is, customers were informed at check-
out by experimenters disguised as staff that the store
had a special promotion valid for one DVD movie per
customer (regular price  $4.50) and that they could
choose between two types of promotion: a sure promo-
tion that guaranteed a discounted sure price of $4 (i.e.,
11% or $0.50 off the regular price) and a probabilis-
tic price promotion. The probabilistic price promotion
was presented as one of the following, depending on
the condition:8
(1) 11% chance to pay a discounted price of $0 and
89% chance to pay the regular price of $4.50,
(2) 12% chance to pay a discounted price of $0.38
and 88% chance to pay the regular price of $4.50, or
(3) 13% chance to pay a discounted price of $0.69
and 87% chance to pay the regular price of $4.50.
That is, we manipulated the chance of winning
the probabilistic price promotion between customers
on three different levels (p  11%, 12%, and 13%,
respectively) while keeping the expected value of the
discounts at $0.50 across all three levels (unlike in
Experiment 2 where the expected value of the discount
increases as p increases) and across both the proba-
bilistic and sure price promotion options.
The three conditions were run one at a time, one
hour each, with a 30-minute break between conditions.
The experiment was conducted over the course of one
day with 163 customers. The order of the conditions
was randomized and the probabilistic price promotion
was carried out by having customers “pull” the handle
of a digital slot machine on a laptop.
Results and Discussion
Independent of whether the probabilistic price promo-
tion offered a chance to get the DVD for free or not, cus-
tomers significantly preferred the probabilistic price
promotion over the sure price promotion: 73% (p11%
free condition 1: χ2(1,N  55) 11.364, p < 0.001), 75%
(p  12% nonfree condition 2: χ2(1,N  55)  13.255,
p < 0.001), and 77% (p  13% nonfree condition 3:
χ2(1,N  53) 15.868, p < 0.001). More importantly, we
compared the percentage of customers choosing the
probabilistic price promotion over the sure price pro-
motion across the three conditions. A nominal logistic
regression revealed no significant difference between
the three conditions (χ2(2,N  163)  0.313, p  0.856,
R2  0.002).
One possible explanation of our findings is that the
two discounted probabilistic nonzero prices ($0.38 and
$0.69) were perceived as zero prices. However, given
that the zero price effect was shown for the differ-
ence between $0 and $0.01 (Shampanier et al. 2007),
this explanation does not seem likely. Rather, we inter-
pret our findings to suggest that the preference for the
probabilistic free price promotion is substantial and
not dependent on the attraction of a zero price or an
aversion to transaction cost.
Figure 5 displays predictions based on only dimin-
ishing sensitivity α  0.88 (Tversky and Kahneman
1992) as well as diminishing sensitivity α  0.88 and
Prelec’s (1998) probability weighting function pi(p) 
exp[−β × (− ln p)γ], with β  1 and γ  0.65. Focusing
on the preference ratios depicted in Figure 5, panel A, a
surprising observation to make again is that the slope
of our findingsmay be better explained by diminishing
sensitivity to prices without weighted probabilities.
Experiment 4: Replication and Novelty
Experiment 4 conceptually replicates Experiment 2
with several extensions. First, it examines the general-
izability of the attraction of the probabilistic free price
promotion to a more expensive product, a rOtring pen
sold at a regular, full price of $10. Second, it tests a
more fine-grained set of probabilities of winning the
probabilistic free price promotion (13 p-levels from 5%
to 95%) to further support the shape of the attraction
to the probabilistic price promotion curve observed in
Experiment 2. Third, it contrasts individuals’ choices
between the probabilistic free and sure price promo-
tions with their choices between risky monetary gain
gambles and sure monetary gains of equal expected
surplus. Fourth, this experiment was run in the labora-
tory as a within-subject design, with one of the partici-
pants’ decisions actually carried out, to assess whether
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Figure 5. (Color online) Predicted Attraction to the 11%
Probabilistic Free and 12% and 13% Probabilistic Nonfree
Price Promotions Over the Sure Price Promotion in
Experiment 3
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Notes. The exepcted discount was held constant at $0.50. Panel A
shows the value ratios, and panel B shows the value differences for
a regular price of $4.50.
the attraction to the probabilistic free price promotion
in any way received a boost from being novel to some
individual participants. Work by Berlyne (e.g., Berlyne
1970, Berlyne and Parham 1968) suggests that novelty
as an arousal-inducing stimulus and its hedonic value
decrease in the face of prolonged repetition of expo-
sure to the novel stimulus and its preference judgment.
In fact, recent work by Dĳksterhuis and Smith (2002)
shows that affective adaptation even happenswith sub-
liminal exposure. Thus, although a probabilistic free
price promotion may have been novel to participants
at the beginning of the series of preference judgments,
we would expect novelty and its resulting attraction to
the probabilistic free price promotion to decline over
the duration of the experiment as a result of affective
adaptation.9
Procedure
The computer-based experiment was part of a one-
hour experimental session consisting of several studies.
The payment for participation in the session was $10.
According to the recruiting flyer and consent form, par-
ticipants expected to leave the session with an average
compensation of $12–$18 in cash and/or in kind and
knew they could withdraw from participation at any
point during the experimental session.
The experiment started with a screening question
asking participants whether they were interested in
the possibility of actually purchasing either a rOtring
pen worth $10 [pictures of the pen in different colors
were displayed on the screen] or a $10 gift certificate
for Amazon.com [a picture of the gift certificate was
displayed on the screen] with their own money. Only
participants who indicated interest proceeded to the
experiment. Eighty-two students participated in this
experiment.
The instructions of the experiment explained that
participants would face 52 decisions and that, at the
end of the experiment, one of the 52 decisions would
be randomly selected and their choice for that decision
would actually be carried out. Participants were pre-
sented with 52 choices each between a risky option and
a sure option (of equal expected value) in terms of a
price promotion on the purchase of a $10 rOtring pen,
a price promotion on the purchase of a $10 gift cer-
tificate for Amazon.com, monetary gains of up to $10,
or monetary losses of up to $10. For each of our four
stimuli (pen, gift certificate, monetary gain, monetary
loss) we varied the probabilities of “winning” the risky
option on 13 levels (i.e., p  5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 33%,
40%, 50%, 60%, 67%, 70%, 80%, 90%, 95%). For exam-
ple, for the p60% level price promotions domain, par-
ticipants were offered a choice between a probabilistic
free price promotion with a 60% chance of paying $0
[(1 − p)  40% chance of paying the regular price of
$10] and a sure price promotion that required paying
$4 [i.e., 60% off the regular price of $10]. For the 60%
level monetary gain domain, participants were offered
a choice between a gamble for a monetary gain with a
60% chance of getting $10 [(1− p) 40% chance of get-
ting $0] and a sure monetary gain of $6. The expected
surplus/discounts in these two choice sets were the
same, $6. Figure 6 displays prospect theory’s predic-
tions for the monetary gain domain (assuming dimin-
ishing sensitivity α  0.88 and probability weighting
with pi(p)  exp[−1 ∗ (− ln p)0.65] applied to all gains).
As can be seen, prospect theory predicts that partici-
pants prefer the probabilistic monetary gain over the
sure monetary gain for small probabilities. Their pref-
erence, however, is expected to decline quickly, and for
p > 24.54%, we expect a preference reversal with a pref-
erence for the sure monetary gain over the probabilis-
tic monetary gain for medium and large probabilities.
Thus, formost probabilitieswe expect to find lower risk
seeking for monetary gains than for purchases with a
price promotion (compare Figure 6 and Figure 2).
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Figure 6. (Color online) Prospect Theory’s Predicted
Attraction to the Probabilistic Monetary Gain over the
Sure Monetary Gain in Experiment 4
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The 52 decisions were split into 4 blocks of 13 by
stimuli. The blocks were randomized in order, as well
as the 13 decisions within each block. In addition, we
counterbalanced between subjects whether the risky
option was displayed to the left or right side of the
sure option. The entire experiment had a 4 (stimuli)×
13 (probabilities) within-subject randomized-block
design. In the following, we focus on only 26 decisions:
the 13 decisions about the purchase of the rOtring pen
and the 13 decisions about monetary gains. For a full
account including all four within-subject conditions,
see Supplementary Materials and Methods.
Results
Figure 7 displays the percentage of participants choos-
ing the risky option over the sure option (i.e., their
risk seeking) on each of the 13 probability levels for
the two domains (rOtring pen with price promotion as
well as monetary gain). As can be seen, for each of the
13 probability levels, despite equivalent expected sur-
plus, participants were more risk seeking in the price
promotion domain than in the monetary gain domain.
In addition, the observed risk seeking for the monetary
gains followed to some extent the predicted pattern in
Figure 6 (for winning probability p > 20%, participants
Figure 7. (Color online) Observed Risk-Seeking Behavior
Across the Pen Purchase-with-Price Promotion Domain and
the Monetary Gain Domain in Experiment 4
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Note. The domains are matched on their expected surplus at each
of the 13 probability levels on the x axis.
no longer preferred the probabilistic monetary gain to
the sure monetary gain).
The top left half of Table 2 shows the parameter esti-
mates from a linear regression model with fixed effects
for respondents (i.e., a dummy variable for each par-
ticipant, excluding one) and cluster-robust standard
errors, choice (0  sure option, 1  risky option) as the
dependent variable, and it assumes domain-specific
intercepts and slope parameters over the 13 probability
levels. The regressionmodel constant was excluded. To
further support our observation from Figure 7 that par-
ticipants’ risk-seeking behaviors differed by domain
(rOtring pen purchase with price promotion and mon-
etary gain), we performed pairwiseWald tests compar-
ing the two intercept and slope parameter estimates
to each other (see the bottom left half of Table 2). The
results revealed that the intercept and slope parameter
estimates for the rOtring pen and monetary gain were
significantly different from each other, suggesting that
participants’ risk-seeking behavior was indeed higher
for the purchase with a price promotion domain than
for the monetary gain domain despite equivalence in
expected surplus. Further, the same as in Experiment 2,
all the way up to the winning probability p  67% the
preference for the probabilistic price promotion over
the sure price promotion was significantly different
from an equal 50:50 split (all p-values < 0.05); for win-
ning probabilities p ≥ 70%, there was no significant
difference from equal 50:50 split (all p-values > 0.3).
Finally, we can examine whether the attraction to the
probabilistic free price promotion for the rOtring pen
was boosted by novelty. For that we can take advan-
tage of the fact that individuals made 2 (blocks: rOtring
pen and Amazon.com gift certificate) × 13 (probabili-
ties) repeated choices in the price promotions domain
and examine participants’ risk seeking for the rOtring
pen purchase when its block came before (i.e., nov-
elty, N  494) or after (i.e., previous exposure, N 
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Table 2. Parameter Estimates B for Choice of Probabilistic/Risky Option Including Wald Tests
of Intercept and Slope Parameter Estimates in Experiment 4
B B
Parameters (Robust SE) Parameters (Robust SE)
Intercepts Intercepts
rOtring pen 0.799∗∗∗ Novelty 0.821∗∗∗
(0.040) (pen before Amazon) (0.068)
Money gain 0.644∗∗∗ Prior exposure 0.882∗∗∗
(0.046) (Amazon before pen) (0.061)
Slopes Slopes
rOtring pen −0.403∗∗∗ Novelty −0.038∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.010)
Money gain −0.637∗∗∗ Prior exposure −0.042∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.011)
R2 0.667 R2 0.673
No. of observations 2,132 No. of observations 1,066
F(1, 81) F(1, 81)
Parameter comparisons (p) Parameter comparisons (p)
Intercepts Intercepts
rOtring penMoney gain 8.72 Novelty Prior exposure 0.43
(0.004) (0.514)
Slopes Slopes
rOtring penMoney gain 6.73 Novelty Prior exposure 0.06
(0.011) (0.811)
Notes. The top left half of the table shows the parameter estimates from a linear regression model with
fixed effects for respondents with cluster-robust standard errors (N  82 clusters), choice (0  sure option,
1 risky option) as the dependent variable, and assuming domain-specific intercepts and slope parameters
over the 13 probability levels. Test parameters on the top right half of the table were estimated from a
linear regression without fixed effects because our two conditions (novelty and prior exposure) are between
subjects and thus perfectly correlated with respondents.
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
572) having encountered the probabilistic price promo-
tion block for the Amazon.com gift certificate. As can
be seen in Figure 8 and the right half of Table 2, we
did not find support for the novelty (also known as
adaption) hypothesis. For the most part, it seems that
participants’ were equally or less likely to choose the
probabilistic free price promotion for the rOtring pen
Figure 8. (Color online) Observed Preference for the
Probabilistic Free Price Promotion over the Equal Expected
Value Sure Price Promotion for the rOtring Pen Offered at a
Regular Price of $10 With or Without Previous Experience
with Probabilistic Free Price Promotions in Experiment 4
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when this was their first, as opposed to second, prob-
abilistic free price promotion block encounter. That is,
the attraction to the probabilistic free price promotion,
if at all, increased with more exposure (see nonsignif-
icant difference of intercept and slope parameters in
pairwise Wald tests in the bottom right half of Table 2).
Discussion
Together, the results of Experiment 4 replicate the find-
ings from Experiment 2 with a more fine-grained set
of probabilities of winning the probabilistic free price
promotion and a more expensive product: individu-
als generally prefer a probabilistic free price promotion
over an equal expected value sure price promotion
across a wide range of probabilities.
The downward sloping trend suggests that the effect
cannot be solely due to the zero price effect, transac-
tion cost considerations, or novelty. Additionally, the
comparison of participants’ choices in the first versus
second free price promotion block encounter further
demonstrates that novelty is likely not the decisive
factor for the observed attraction to the probabilistic
free price promotion: participants’ attraction does not
decrease over the course of the within-subject design
with its multiple trials.
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The direct comparison of participants’ choices in
the monetary gain domain and the price promotion
domain in Figure 7 shows that participants were sig-
nificantly more risk seeking (i.e., more likely to choose
the risky option) in the context of price promotions
than in the context of monetary gains. Participants’
observed behavior for monetary gains largely followed
prospect theory’s predicted pattern (compare dashed
lines in Figure 7 and Figure 6). Similarly, the behavior
observed in the price promotion domain can be suffi-
ciently explained by individuals’ diminishing sensitiv-
ity to the prices with or without weighted probabilities
(compare solid line in Figure 7 to solid and dashed
lines in Figure 2).
Experiment 5: Separate Evaluation Setting
Experiments 1–4, the main focus of this paper, revealed
that when consumers face a choice (joint evaluation
setting) between a sure price promotion and a proba-
bilistic free price promotion of equal expected discount
for the same product, they overwhelmingly choose the
probabilistic price promotion (risky option).
In what follows, we expand our focus and present
two hypothetical experiments with substantially more
expensive products (hotel rooms sold at a regular, full
price of $200 per night) in which we examine the effec-
tiveness of the two types of promotions in separate
evaluation settings. That is, we examine their effective-
ness in an indirect choice paradigm with two different
products (adopted from Gneezy et al. 2006) where one
product is promoted and another product is not. We
do this to broaden the generalizability of our findings
and examine if, when a company wants to temporarily
promote one of their products over others (e.g., Procter
and Gamble deciding to promote their Pantene sham-
poos but not their Herbal Essences shampoos), offer-
ing a probabilistic free price promotion versus a sure
price promotion makes a difference in terms of market
shares. Specifically, we test whether the probabilis-
tic free price promotion is likely to attract more con-
sumers (increase traffic; Experiment 5a) and encourage
greater spending (basket size; Experiment 5b) than a
sure price promotion—two measures of great impor-
tance for marketers.
The findings from Experiments 1–4 support the con-
clusion that, when comparing sure and probabilistic
free price promotions, people focus on the magnitude
of the prices. In addition, because in these joint eval-
uation settings we offered two types of promotion for
the same product, the product itself became irrelevant
(nondiscriminatory), making prices and discounts par-
ticularly salient. In the new, separate evaluation set-
ting in Experiments 5a and 5b, because we now also
make the product become a discriminatory attribute,
the impact of prices and discounts relative to the prod-
uct may be reduced. However, as long as prices and
discounts continue to be discriminatory, wewould con-
tinue to expect an attention to prices and thus, based on
our previous theoretical reasoning with diminishing
sensitivity (see the Behavioral Fundamentals section),
higher demand for the probabilistic free price promo-
tion than the sure price promotion.
In addition, previous research has shown that joint
versus separate evaluation settings change the way
people evaluate options (Hsee et al. 1991). The under-
lying evaluability hypothesis posits that attributes that
are relatively difficult compared to relatively easy to
evaluate independently have a lesser impact in sep-
arate than in joint evaluation settings, whereas easy-
to-evaluate attributes remain equally impactful. Our
separate evaluation setting in Experiments 5a and
5b removes the comparison price promotion (e.g.,
a probabilistic free price promotion product is now
compared to a nonpromotion product rather than to
another sure price promotion product). Given that
prices and discounts are considered to be relatively
easy-to-evaluate attributes, they therefore continue to
be salient attributes. Thus, again, we would continue
to expect to find the probabilistic free price promotion
to attract more demand than the sure price promotion.
Procedure
Four hundred (Experiment 5a) and five hundred
(Experiment 5b) participants in the United States
were recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk10) in exchange for 30 cents to complete a short
vacation study on Qualtrics.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five
between-subject conditions in which they were asked
to imagine that they were going on a seven-day vaca-
tion to Spain and were debating between a cultural
vacation in the city of Barcelona and a beach vacation
in a coastal resort approximately 100 miles south of
Barcelona. The participants were told that they went
on Kayak.com to compare hotel prices and found one
four-star hotel in Barcelona and one four-star hotel in
the beach resort, both offered at a regular, full price of
$200 per night, where they would consider staying at.
They were then presented with regular or discounted
prices per night for those two hotels and asked in
Experiment 5a, to indicate which vacation (Barcelona
city hotel or beach resort hotel) they would choose; in
Experiment 5b, theywere asked howmany of the seven
days, if any, they would book at each place. That is, in
each condition participants needed to make a decision
between the Barcelona city hotel and the beach resort
hotel.
The price per night for the beach resort hotel was
kept at the regular, full price of $200 across all condi-
tions, whereas the price of the Barcelona city hotel was
varied across conditions to either be $200 (control con-
dition) or discounted such that the expected discount
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was $20. There were three discounted price conditions
for the Barcelona city hotel: a sure price promotion
condition with a discounted price of $180; a probabilis-
tic free price promotion condition with a 10% chance
of not paying anything and 90% chance of paying the
regular, full price of $200; and a probabilistic nonfree
price promotion condition with a 20% chance of pay-
ing a discounted price of $100 and 80% chance of pay-
ing the regular, full price of $200. Finally, we added
an exploratory fifth condition in which we told par-
ticipants that the Barcelona city hotel offered a choice
between a sure price promotion (with a discounted
price of $180) and a 10% probabilistic free price promo-
tion (with a 10% chance of paying $0 and 90% chance of
paying the regular, full price of $200; choice condition).
In this exploratory condition, in Experiment 5b, if par-
ticipants indicated they wanted to spend one or more
days at the Barcelona city hotel, on the next page they
were asked to choose between the sure and probabilis-
tic free price promotion for the Barcelona city hotel.11
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
five conditions. Upon indicating how they would want
to spend their seven-day vacation, participants in both
experiments were asked to indicate how much, in gen-
eral, they liked beach vacations and city vacations (on
nine-point scales each), their gender, age, ethnicity,
and highest finished degree of education. The survey
ended with an attention question that we planned to
use to exclude participants if wrongly answered (for all
questions, see SupplementaryMaterials andMethods).
In what follows we present and discuss our find-
ings excluding the exploratory fifth condition. For a
full account of the data and results, see Supplementary
Materials and Methods.
Experiment 5a: Results
Table 3 shows the parameter estimates from a nom-
inal logistic regression model with choice (0  beach
Table 3. Percentages and Parameter Estimates B for Choice of Barcelona City Hotel over Beach Resort
Hotel in Experiment 5a with Sure Price Promotion as Baseline
Nominal logistic regression
Choice of
Condition Barcelona vacation (%) B (SE) χ2 p-value 95% CI
Intercept — <− 0.001 0.00 1.000 −0.435 0.435
(0.221)
Sure price promotion 50.0 — — — — —
Probabilistic free price promotion 75.3 1.115 10.80 <0.001 0.460 1.795
(.339)
Probabilistic nonfree price promotion 63.0 0.531 2.77 0.096 −0.091 1.162
(0.319)
Control (no price promotion) 53.7 0.147 0.22 0.639 −0.466 0.762
(0.313)
Notes. The baseline condition is highlighted in grey. Whole model test pseudo-R2  0.031, N  326. CI, confidence
interval.
resort vacation, 1  Barcelona city vacation, N  326)
as the dependent variable, the sure price promotion
condition as baseline, and the remaining three con-
ditions as independent variables (dummy coded with
1  condition, 0  not this condition). As can be seen,
significantly more participants chose the Barcelona
city vacation over the beach resort vacation when the
Barcelona city hotel was offered with a probabilistic
free price promotion (75.3%) than when it was offered
with a sure price promotion (50.0%). Interestingly,
no promotion for the Barcelona city hotel (control:
53.7%) was not less successful than offering a sure pro-
motion (50.0%).
The difference between the two probabilistic price
promotions (nonfree, 63.0%, vs. free price, 75.3%) was
only marginally significant (χ2(1,N  162)  2.908, p 
0.088), the same as the difference between the proba-
bilistic nonfree price promotion (63.0%) and the sure
price promotion (50.0%; see Table 3). Figure 9 displays
predictions based on only diminishing sensitivity α 
0.88 (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) as well as diminish-
ing sensitivity α  0.88 and Prelec’s (1998) probability
weighting function pi(p) exp[−β ∗(− ln p)γ], with β 1
and γ  0.65. As in Experiment 3, a suprising observa-
tion to make is that our findings seem best explained
by diminishing sensitivity to prices without weighted
probabilities.
Finally, an ANOVA found no significant effect of
our conditions on how much participants liked a city
vacation over a beach vacation (mean 0.01, SD 2.71,
F(3, 322)  1.622, p  0.184; for means and standard
deviations by condition, see Table S5 in the online sup-
plementary materials and methods).
Experiment 5b: Results
An overall ANOVA revealed a significant difference of
condition on number of days booked at the Barcelona
city hotel (F(3, 405)  7.515, p < 0.001). Table 4 shows
the parameter estimates from a linear regressionmodel
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Figure 9. (Color online) Predicted Attraction to the 10%
Probabilistic Free and 20% NonFree Price Promotions over
the Sure Price Promotion in Experiment 5a
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Note. The exepcted discount was held constant at $20 and the reg-
ular price at $200.
with number of days booked at the Barcelona city
hotel as the dependent variable, the sure price pro-
motion condition as baseline, and the remaining three
conditions as independent variables (dummy coded
Table 4. Means and Parameter Estimates B for Number of Days Booked at the Barcelona City Hotel in
Experiment 5b with Sure Price Promotion as Baseline
Days Linear regression
Condition Mean (SD) B (SE) t p-value 95% CI
Intercept — 3.832 21.40 <0.001 3.480 4.184
(0.180)
Sure price promotionA 3.83 — — — — —
(1.83)
Probabilistic FREE price promotionB 4.53 0.693 2.73 0.007 0.194 1.192
(1.97) (0.254)
Probabilistic nonfree price promotionA 3.97 0.139 0.55 0.579 −0.355 0.634
(1.84) (0.251)
Control (no price promotion)C 3.34 −0.495 −1.97 <0.050 −0.989 −0.001
(1.54) (0.251)
Notes. Conditions not connected by the same superscript letter A, B, or C are significantly different (p < 0.05), by
pairwise student’s t-tests. The baseline condition is highlighted in grey. Whole model test R2  0.053, N  409.
with 1  condition, 0  not this condition). As can be
seen, participants (N  409) booked significantly more
days at the Barcelona city hotel when it was offered
with a probabilistic free price promotion (mean  4.53
days, SD  1.97) than when it was offered with a sure
price promotion (mean 3.83 days, SD 1.83, t(405)
2.731, p  0.007), a probabilistic nonfree price promo-
tion (mean  3.97 days, SD  1.84, t(405)  2.197, p 
0.029), or no price promotion (mean  3.34 days, SD 
1.54, t(405)  4.715, p < 0.001). The difference between
the probabilistic nonfree price promotion (mean 3.97
days) and the sure price promotion (mean 3.83 days,
t(405)  0.555, p  0.579) was not significantly differ-
ent. Finally, an ANOVA found no significant effect of
our conditions on how much participants liked a city
vacation over a beach vacation (mean  −0.19, SD 
2.84, F(3, 405)  0.831, p  0.478; for means and stan-
dard deviations by condition, see Table S5 in the online
supplementary materials and methods).
Discussion
Together, the results of Experiments 5a and 5b sug-
gest that, even for fairly expensive products and in a
separate valuation setting, the probabilistic free price
promotion can be superior to a sure price promotion
of equal expected discount. The findings are particu-
larly powerful because they show that the probabilistic
free price promotion in comparison to the sure price
promotion may not only encourage more people to
make a planned purchase (i.e., increase the number
of customers) but also the average customer to spend
more money (i.e., increase the average basket size per
customer).12
General Discussion
What type of price promotion is more attractive to cus-
tomers: a probabilistic price promotion that offers a
chance p to get one’s selected products for free and
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a chance (1 − p) to pay the regular, full price or a
certain price promotion of equal expected discount?
Across four incentive-compatible experiments (Exper-
iments 1–4, three in the field and one in the labora-
tory) we considered consumers’ choices between sure
and probabilistic free price promotions (joint valua-
tion setting) and demonstrated that consumers consis-
tently, over a range of probabilities (5%–67%), products
(candy, DVD rental, rOtring pen), expected discounts,
and regular prices ($0.75, $4.50, and $10), preferred
the probabilistic free price promotion to the sure price
promotion. In addition, extending our findings from
the joint valuation settings, Experiments 5a and 5b
showed, in hypothetical, separate valuation settings
with even more expensive products (hotel rooms; reg-
ular price  $200), that the probabilistic free price pro-
motion can also increase demand for a product and
do so significantly better than the sure price pro-
motion in two ways: by attracting more consumers
(i.e., traffic) and by increasing the average demand
of consumers (i.e., their basket size). Together our
experiments demonstrate that a probabilistic free price
promotion can be a powerful promotions tool to attract
more purchases.
From a theoretical perspective, our findings extend
previous research on psychological pricing by showing
that they cannot be explained by the uncertainty or cer-
tainty effect. In addition, our results do not seem to be
driven by an attraction to zero prices, transaction cost
aversion, or novelty. Instead, our findings can be best
explained by the assumption that individuals behave
in a Weber–Fechnerian way: they display diminishing
sensitivity (α < 1) to the prices.
Limitations and Future Research
Several of our findings are worth further examination.
First we did not find any evidence for the uncertainty
effect (Gneezy et al. 2006, Newman and Mochon 2012,
Simonsohn 2009), which would have favored the sure
price promotion. One of the fundamental differences
we found was that in those uncertainty effect stud-
ies where participants were asked to choose between
a sure versus a probabilistic option, the (un)certainty
was in windfall (i.e., there was no cost involved for par-
ticipants) rewards. For example, in Gneezy et al. (2006,
Section IV) in one of the choice task conditions, partic-
ipants were asked to choose between a sure monetary
reward (100 shekels) and a lottery that would pay out
one of two possible products of differing values (a 50%
chance at a 200-shekel gift certificate and a 50% chance
at a 400-shekel gift certificate for a bookstore). Seventy-
four percent of their participants choose the sure 100
shekels in cash, whereas only 43% of participants did
so when the alternative was a sure 200-shekel gift cer-
tificate. By contrast, in our setting, the (un)certainty
was in the prices that consumers paid in exchange for
a good.
Note also that in Dhar and colleagues’ (1995, 1999)
research, which we discussed in the section “Pre-
vious Consumer Behavior Research on Probabilistic
Promotions,” participants were asked to choose be-
tween a sure versus a probabilistic option where the
(un)certainty was in the percent discounts that con-
sumers would receive when making a payment. By
contrast, in our setting the (un)certainty was in the
absolute prices that consumers would pay. Dhar et al.
(1995, 1999) did not find any difference in the attraction
of the sure versus risky option.
Given the differences between our findings, the
uncertainty effect findings by Gneezy et al. (2006),
and the findings by Dhar et al. (1995, 1999), one
avenue for future research could be to examine to what
extent the type of focal attribute (e.g., reward, absolute
price, or percent discount) and context (e.g., whether
there is a purchase transaction and as such a cost to
the consumer) influences consumers’ decision-making
process and, ultimately, preferences (i.e., they become
risk averse, risk seeking, or risk neutral).
The zero price effect is another factor for which we
found no evidence of it being a fundamental driver
of the attraction to the probabilistic free price promo-
tion. One possibility is that the excessive attraction to
the zero price reported in Shampanier et al. (2007) was
not apparent in our probabilistic setup because the
zero price represents only one of two possible price
outcomes, and therefore the zero price effect does not
apply. In the original work on the zero price effect, the
authors argued that, when there is a zero price option
that does not have any downside (i.e., no cost), indi-
viduals experience a positive affective reaction, which
acts as a decision-making cue (i.e., the cause of the
zero price effect is the affective component). In the
probabilistic free price promotion, however, there is a
downside or cost: a chance to pay the regular price.
In addition, choosing between a nonfree offer and a
free offer arguably requires fewer cognitive resources
than choosing between a nonfree sure offer and a risky
offer of two possible outcomes: one free (discounted
probabilistic price of $0) and one nonfree (regular price
of >$0). This aspect is critical because, in their zero
price paper, Shampanier et al. (2007, Experiment 6)
showed that making more cognitive and deliberate
evaluations of alternatives eliminates the zero price
effect because of a lower weight on affective evalua-
tions. Future work could validate this distinction.
An additional research opportunity may stem from
our surprising findings in Experiments 2, 3, and 5,
which suggest that diminishing sensitivity without
probability weighting predicts the observed pattern
of preferences for probabilistic free price promotions
better than diminishing sensitivity with probability
Mazar, Shampanier, and Ariely: When Retailing and Las Vegas Meet
Management Science 63(1), pp. 250–266, ©2017 The Author(s) 265
weighting. Future researchmaywant to examine if and
why individuals do not appear to weight probabili-
ties in probabilistic price promotions as they have been
shown to do in simple monetary gambles.
Finally, it remains an open question how robust the
attraction of the probabilistic price promotion is to dif-
ferent types of framing. For example, in three pricing
experiments, Yang et al. (2013) found that participants’
willingness to pay for a risky product (e.g., a gift cer-
tificate for a Barnes and Noble bookstore that has a
50% chance to have a $50 value and a 50% chance to
have a $100 value) is substantially reduced when it is
labeled instead as a gamble, lottery, raffle, or coin flip
with two outcomes. The authors posit that this is due
to an aversion to bad deals that causes buyers to shift
the focus of their attention to risk and the worst possi-
ble outcome. In our experiments we did not present the
risky option as a gamble but as a price promotion. In
addition, our consumers engaged in a choice task typ-
ical for purchase situations rather than a pricing task.
Future research may want to examine to what extent
the bad deal aversion also applies to choice tasks and
thus may reduce the attraction of the probabilistic free
price promotion over the sure price promotion when
the former is framed in terms of a gamble. The ques-
tion of such potential boundary conditions is of great
practical importance for marketers.
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Endnotes
1See Ailawadi et al. (2014) for a recent paper that formulates, esti-
mates, and analyzes a model of consumer response to conditional
nonfree discounts (i.e., there is no chance to get something for
free) with ambiguous probabilities linked to a popular sports event
occurring (versus sure discounts). Ailawadi et al. (2014) find that
the response to such conditional promotions is highly segmented
and related among others to perceived thinking costs, saving ben-
efits, and entertainment benefits, as well as to event involvement
and gambling proneness, the latter two of which in particular affect
a consumer’s estimate of the likelihood of the event occurring.
2Although traditionally the terms “risk aversion” and “risk seek-
ing” are used to describe concavity and convexity, respectively, of
the utility function, we use these terms to refer to their resulting
choice properties. For example, “risk seeking” refers to an observed
preference for a risky option over a sure option of equal expected
monetary value.
3Equation (5) is true if and only if 1−(1−p)α < p, which is equivalent
to 1− p < (1− p)α , which is true for all 0 < p < 1 and α < 1.
4 In all experiments, except for Experiment 1, probabilities were
presented as percentages. The discounted probabilistic free price
was typically presented as both $0 and “free.”
5The vending machine was stocked to produce a random sequence
for the probabilistic discount as opposed to, for example, a free
candy every third purchase.
6We are assuming independence of observations for the χ2 test but,
in actuality, we were not able to track and thus ensure that each of
our purchase observations was made by a unique customer.
7As Weber and Chapman (2005) report, it is not clear whether
people actually become risk seeking. Further, risk seeking is
not a necessary requirement of the “peanuts” effect (Prelec and
Loewenstein 1991).
8As a result of rounding, the expected values of the probabilistic
price promotions are not exactly $0.50. They are $0.495 in condi-
tion 1, $0.494 in condition 2, and $0.495 in condition 3.
9Given the work by Berlyne (e.g., Berlyne 1970, Berlyne and Parham
1968), as well as Dĳksterhuis and Smith (2002), it is reasonable
to argue that our participants would experience affective adaption
even without each decision actually being played out before the
onset of the next trial. That is, for affective adaption to happen, it is
not necessary for participants to experience winning or losing with
the probabilistic free price promotion before they make the next
decision.
10For an examination of the demographic makeup of MTurk partic-
ipants and the quality of the data obtained with that sample, see,
e.g., Buhrmester et al. (2011) and Paolacci et al. (2010).
11That is, unlike in the other conditions, in this condition partic-
ipants had to engage in a two-step decision-making process. This
second step was not existent in Experiment 5a.
12Note, in this separate valuation setting, the inferiority of the sure
price promotion to the probabilistic free price promotion could also
be in part a result of the sure discount undermining perceptions
of quality, which free offers are believed less likely to do (see, e.g.,
Chandran and Morwitz 2006, Darke and Chung 2005).
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